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The Dynamics of Democracy: Travel,
Premature Predation, and the
Components of Political Identity
Nicholas S. Zeppos*

Democracy is indeed an elusive concept and any effort to develop the constituent elements of so important a political idea ought
to be encouraged. From any number of perspectives it is clear that
democracy must include more than simply ratifying the outcomes of
either citizen or representative voting., And when a court is asked to
set aside the results of a process some describe as democratic, the
challenge to enrich the concept becomes even more pressing, particularly when the judicial power is invoked in the name of enhancing
democracy. 2 The Supreme Court's decision in Romer v. Evans3 dramatically poses the problem. The Court there invalidated a state
constitutional provision that had been adopted by a direct vote of the
citizens of the state of Colorado. For Justice Scalia in dissent, it was
inconceivable for the Court to set aside this purest expression of
4
democracy.
In her Article, Professor Schacter addresses the challenge
posed by Romer, and in doing so seeks to broaden and enrich the
concept of democracy.
Professor Schacter rejects the narrow,
*
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. Karin Hoppmann C97) provided invaluable
support and assistance at every stage of this project. I am deeply indebted to her for
outstanding research, insightful comments, and challenging questions.
1.
See, for example, Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (Wiley, 2d ed.
1963); Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, 1982). Professor
Schacter has pointed out that the Court may itself subscribe to several theories of democracy
that do not consist solely of such ratification. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The
Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 613-46
(1995).
2.
The classic expression is found in John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust. A Theory of
JudicialReview (Harvard U., 1980).
3.
116 S. Ct. 1620, 134 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1996).
4.
See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Justice Thomas's
dissent in U.S. Termn Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1875, 131 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (lamenting the majority's willingness to strike down a state provision
prescribing term limits for state delegates to Congress that had garnered nearly 60% of the
popular vote).
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conventional approach that undergirds Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion and the Court's general equal protection analysis. Rather
than focusing-as the Court does-on the problem of the rights of the
minority to be free from majority abuse, Professor Schacter attempts
to offer two substantive refinements to the idea of democracy.
First, Professor Schacter argues that democracy must include
a fundamental right to participate in the political process.5 Thus, the
evil of the law in Romer was not just majority discrimination, but the
ultimate disenfranchisement of gays from the political process. With
no ability to seek the protection of the government, gays were
virtually frozen out of the ordinary give and take of interest group
politics. Second, Professor Schacter argues that democracy must
include the social dimensions of citizenry and identity.6 These social
dimensions of democracy occur outside of formal law and outside of
what is normally considered the political process, at the most basic of
citizen-to-citizen relations in society. This world-the non-legal, nonpolitical-is the arena in which norms evolve that define our daily
freedoms, where attitudes are formed and roles created, and where
the most fundamental structures of human interaction are put in
place. 7 Full participation in this social sphere is a central component
of what it means to be a citizen in a democracy. For Professor
Schacter, these two refinements better explain the result in Romer,
and are part of her larger project to develop a broader, more
s
substantively enriched vision of democracy
There is much to agree with in Professor Schacter's Article,
and it certainly offers us a better understanding of the result in
Romer v. Evans and the concept of democracy. She offers two specific
components of what she claims to be a fuller account of
democracy--citizen participation in the political process, and an
inclusion of the social sphere. My disagreement with the Article is
where it leaves off. Claims that democracy must or should include
certain spheres of action or protect certain participatory rights (more
5.
See Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy'sDomain, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 361,
399 (1997).
6.
See id. at 400.
7.
See Symposium: Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643 (1996). See in
particular Dennis Chong, Values Versus Interests in the Explanation of Social Conflict, 144 U.
Pa. L. Rev.'2079, 2096-98 (1996) (describing the "Code of the Streets"-the extralegal social code
of inner-city youth); Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev.
2181 (1996). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903,
914-21 (1996) (describing extralegal norms that govern a wide sphere of everyday activity and
are enforced by equally extralegal social sanctions).
8.
See Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuitof "PopularIntent". Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct
Democracy, 105 Yale L. J. 107 (1995); Schacter, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 593 (cited in note 1).
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than or in addition to others) are useful points for departure, yet
eventually they require a more robust defense, or at least a more
detailed description of how these components-political participation
and the social sphere-operate in a democracy9 Failure to provide
the latter places the former on shaky ground, or worse yet, such
claims can be misunderstood as mere exhortations to design a system
of democracy along the lines suggested. Yet the facts, background,
and context of Romer v. Evans provide an opportunity to detail a
richer account of the mechanics of democracy, and to describe a
normative defense for the claims that are implicit in Professor
Schacter's effort. I offer three propositions, drawn from Romer v.
Evans, that at least ought to be explored in Professor Schacter's
account of democracy.
Proposition One:
Democracy cannot narrowly focus on
participationin the political or governmental process and the right to
vote, but must include the individual'santecedent choice, including the
right to travel and choose a community in which to live.
The Court in Romer v. Evans tells a simple, static story of a
political process that ends with the state of Colorado-through its
citizens-discriminating against gays in a statewide initiative,
Amendment 2. The state's action is the Court's focus, which allows
the Court to analyze the case as a classic equal protection problem-a
minority is being oppressed by the actions of the majority. Yet the
political process that triggered the dispute in Romer is actually much
more complicated and interesting. Gays in Colorado had obtained
modest political victories by having antidiscrimination ordinances
enacted in local communities. Amendment 2 was adopted in response
to these political victories, and acted to reverse these gains. Thus,
Amendment 2 did not simply provide that the state would offer no
protection against discrimination for gays; it specifically prohibited
any local governmental entity from doing so, even if the citizens and
representatives of that community wished to adopt such policies.
While claiming that democracy must include the rights of citizens to participate in the political process, Professor Schacter does not
ask where this participation is to occur, and never explores the significance of what seems to be the real democracy puzzle posed by

9.

See also Sandel, Liberalism (cited in note 1).
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Romer v. Evans-how does the concept of democracy address a conflict between "democratic" outcomes at two levels of local government?
It seems evident that in parts of Colorado, communities had
evolved that provided gays a modest level of tolerance and participation.
Three communities whose ordinances were reversed by
Amendment 2-Aspen, Denver, and Boulder' 0-would seem to fall
into this category. If those communities are open and accessible-not
just for gays but also for others who choose to live in a political and
social community generally tolerant of gays"-individuals may select
and live where their preferences will most likely be honored. Their
political preferences should be reflected in successful political
outcomes. Central to this matching of preferences is the right of
persons to travel to and settle in such a community. 2 And without
this right to travel it is likely that democracy will do a poor job of
ensuring that individuals maximize their welfare.
Imagine a community with one hundred people, in which sixty
people vote against an ordinance and forty people vote for the
ordinance. The forty people can remain in the community and have
their preferences unfulfilled.
Or they can move to another
community, where their preferences are more in line with the
majority's. Large communities sometimes do an inadequate job of
implementing the preferences of their citizens and it is an essential
component of democracy to allow people the right to exit and form or
join new communities.13 In the context of Romer v. Evans, the interesting question is whether communities have evolved that provide
gays some level of tolerance, protection, and political participation,
and that are accessible to both gays and those who seek to live in
10. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623.
11. Justice Scalia generally ignores this second group of supporters for antidiscrimination
ordinances. His concern is that "because those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to
reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities," such persons can devote their
political power to gaining "not merely a grudging social toleration, but full social acceptance, of
homosexuality." Id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus Justice Scalia identifies only those
who engage in same-sex intimacy as credible advocates of homophilic legislation.
12. For snapshots of the evolution of the fundamental right to travel, see, for example,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding unconstitutional a state residency requirement for welfare assistance when the requirement infringed upon a citizen's fundamental right
to travel, to "migrate," which was derived from "constitutional concepts of personal liberty"),
overruled in part on other grounds, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)
(holding unconstitutional Tennessee's residence requirement for voting because the
requirement violated the "fundamental interese' in voting and burdened the right to travel).
13. Jonathan Macey notes that states suffer stiff regulatory competition because individuals adversely affected by state regulation may exit the state and migrate to a more favorable regulatory environment. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and
the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanationof Federalism, 76 Va.
L. Rev. 265, 273 (1990).
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what they believe will be a more tolerant community. It may be that
the modest political successes that were undone by the state-wide
initiative addressed in Romer v. Evans were the result of a series of
demographic and social migration patterns. 14 The compact geographical concentration of gays that some have observed-often as an
essential part of self-defense15 and identity formation16-and the political successes that follow,' may be linked to the fundamental right
to travel and form social, economic, and political communities on a
local level.
Of course, Tiebout argued that an efficient level of public goods
will be set if people are allowed to travel and select a community that
reflects their preferences. 8 So too, it is rational for individuals to
seek out those communities that best reflect their preferences on

14. See Kenneth D. Wald, James W. Button, and Barbara A. Rienzo, The Politics of Gay
Rights in American Communities: Explaining Antidiscrimination Ordinancesand Policies, 40
Am.J. Pol. Sci. 1152, 1156-57 (1996) (arguing that the principal stimulus for gay political action
was social dislocation and geographic migration following World War II).
15. See Margaret Cruikshank, The Gay and Lesbian LiberationMovement 2-3 (Routledge,
1992) (asserting that group solidarity allows comfortable revelation of individual identity that
otherwise would invite intolerable persecution).
16. There is a wealth of social science literature exploring this relationship. See, for
example, Vivienne C. Cass, Homosexual Identity Formation: A Theoretical Model, 4(3) J.
Homosexuality 219, 229-34 (1979) (identifying contact with other gays and the gay subculture as
necessary to homosexual identity formation); Stephen Cox and Cynthia Gallois, Gay and
Lesbian Identity Development. A Social Identity Perspective, 30(4) J. Homosexuality 1 (1996)
(describing the "social interaction" approach to identity development, which places an emphasis
on interaction with the gay subculture as an important step in the development of a gay identity).
But see Susan Krieger, Lesbian Identity and Community: Recent Social Science
Literature, in Estelle B. Freedman, Barbara C. Gelpi, Susan L. Johnson and Kathleen M.
Weston, eds., The Lesbian Issue: Essays from SIGNS 223, 223 (U. of Chicago, 1985) (noting that
a lesbian community may harm the formation of lesbian identity as well as nurture it). See also
Vivienne C. Cass, Homosexual Identity: A Concept in Need of Definition, 9(2/3) J. Homosexuality
105, 112 (1983/1984) (gathering studies that describe the influence of gay subculture on gay
identity); Krieger, LesbianIdentity in Freedman, Gelpi, Johnson, and Weston, eds., The Lesbian
Issue at 229-37 (cited in this note) (listing nine social science studies from the 1970s and 1980s
evaluating both the positive and negative influences of cohesive communities on the formation
of lesbian identity). Compare these approaches with that of Richard Troiden, who argues that
identity disclosure is a matter of post hoc identity "management' rather than a prerequisite to
identity development.
Richard R. Troiden, Self, Self-Concept, Identity, and Homosexual
Identity: Constructs in Need of Definition and Differentiation 10(3/4) J. Homosexuality 97, 105
(1984).
17. For examples of political successes due to geographic compactness, see Cruikshank,
Liberation Movement at 134-35 (cited in note 15) (recognizing the political advances gained in
San Francisco, which was an early and enduring haven for gay men and lesbians); Barry D.
Adam, The Rise of a Gay and Lesbian Movement (Twayne, rev. ed. 1995) (detailing homophile
movements throughout the century). See also Cruikshank, Liberation Movement at 121 (cited
in note 15) (stating that the first political "victory" for homosexual people was the very right to
associate in gay bars).
18. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956).
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tolerance toward gays or other oppressed groups. 19 Thus, while
Professor Schacter is clearly correct in criticizing the majority in
Romer v. Evans for adopting the simplistic majority versus minority
model to measure the constitutionality of Amendment 2, she nonetheless fails to explore an important part of political activity. Romer
suggests that she should include within her concept of political
participation the basic right of the citizen to travel and to join a
political, social, and economic community, choices that precede the
involvement of citizens in interest group politics.
Proposition Two:
The pre-participatory acts of choice of
community formation and the initial stages of politicaldevelopment in
that community may not be prematurely terminated-sub-unitswithin
a larger political entity must be given time to gain strength and
cohesiveness.
Democracy is a dynamic, competitive process. Proposition One
identifies one strand of political participation: citizens may travel
and choose to be part of a community. As individuals choose
communities where their political preferences are more likely to be
honored, political successes in these local smaller governmental units
may be accomplished. This was obviously the case in Romer v. Evans,
where gays had achieved success on the municipal level with the
enactment of ordinances banning discrimination based on sexual
orientation. And it was these local political victories that threatened
voters in other parts of the state of Colorado. Faced with this threat
the political strategy of those who disagreed with the gay rights ordinances was clear: to subsume the municipal units within a larger and
more hostile political arena at the statewide level.
The first obvious consequence of this strategy was to undo the
effect of the right to travel and choose a political community. For
those citizens who chose Aspen, Denver, or Boulder the political arena
was now the state of Colorado. The shifting of the issue to the state
level forced their political interactions into a more hostile arena. The
political power that gays had obtained through community choice was
engulfed and diffused. In Tiebout's terms, the forty citizens who
moved out of the community of one hundred to better maximize their
utility were now forced back into that larger community so that their

19.

See Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,

Organizations,and States 4, 109 (Harvard U., 1970) (describing the power to exit communities
as a way for individuals to obtain their social preferences).
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choices could be undone. But the strategy of shifting the political
arena that triggered the litigation in Romer v. Evans poses an even
more fundamental question about democratic process and the evolution of political units: can the majority within a larger political system kill off a potentially competitive minority ideology by unilaterally
forcing the competitor into interaction that the citizens of competitor
would prefer to avoid? In other words, the rational strategy for the
threatened majority may be to try to kill off political development in a
smaller system early on before it becomes a new majority. Viewed in
this manner, lessons may be drawn from two disciplines that seek to
understand survival and evolution of competing strategies within
different systems.
First, an analogy may be drawn to findings in the field of evolutionary biology. 2 Biologists have observed that a developing species
has a better chance of survival if the species limits external
interactions and produces a system of cooperation and
interdependence.21 And conversely, when the interaction is random
and does not allow for the formation of cooperative, interdependent
communities, the species will face barriers to survival. The lesson
from species evolution is therefore quite clear: remain separate and
gain strength by avoiding interaction in the larger population.
Immediate involvement will choke off growth and development.
Similar conclusions have been derived from experimental game
theory. Computer tournaments have been run to see what strategy
wins out among others in a prisoner's dilemma. The strategies offered in the tournaments range from the competitive, mean, or bad to
the nice, forgiving, and cooperative. 22 Anyone using a strategy
characterized as nice or forgiving is immediately overwhelmed and
defeated if placed into a large tournament with players using bad or
20. No doubt the application of some of this learning-controversial within the field of biology itself-must be done with a fair amount of caution and realization of the limits of the
analogy to legal evolution. Other applications of evolutionary biology and explorations of the
limits of its usefulness to law can be found in Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and
Economics, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 641 (1996) (incorporating modern trends in evolutionary science
into the classical analogy between biological evolution and law and economics); J.B. Ruhl, The
Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its
PracticalMeaningfor Democracy, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1407 (1996) (drawing analogies between the
evolution of biological systems and the evolution of law); E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary
Tradition in Jurisprudence,85 Colum. L. Rev. 38 (1985). See also Owen D. Jones, Law and
Evolutionary Biology: Obstacles and Opportunities, 10 J. Contemp. Health L. & Policy 265
(1993) (warning of the practical effects of importing concepts from evolutionary biology to law).
21. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation98-100 (Basic Books, 1984).
22. Id. at 27-54 (describing various tournament strategies and their relative successes).
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mean strategies.23 A different outcome occurs if multiple players
using the nice or forgiving strategies are allowed a minimum number
of interactions that allow them to accumulate points by their
cooperation efforts. When that limited interaction occurs the nice or
forgiving strategies will eventually become strong enough to compete
24
effectively in the larger game against the bad or hostile strategies.
Indeed, once established the nice strategies become evolutionarily
stable.
Again, the parallel to democratic development in Romer v.
Evans is interesting. Gay political success occurred when political
interactions were limited to those who had chosen the same "strategy"
of living in Aspen, Denver, or Boulder. But when these political
groups were, so shortly after political success, thrown into state-wide
competition, they were overwhelmed and defeated. 25 Local democratic
majorities, like other evolving competitive systems, may also require
time to develop strength on their own before inclusion into a larger
arena.
By expanding democracy to include these first two propositions-a right to travel and form communities and a right not to be
immediately overwhelmed by larger political communities-it is necessary to examine more closely and critically those social, economic,
and political forces that shape the choices and structures of communities. At the same time, however, this dynamic model of democracy
begins to provide a response to Justice Scalia's economic account of
the reasons why the state-wide initiative in Romer v. Evans ought to
have been upheld. In a twist on footnote four of United States v.
Carolene Products Co.,2s Justice Scalia argues against any need for

23. Id. at 63-64.
24. Id. at 64-69, 129-32 (describing this strategy of"clustering" or invasion by clusters).
25. Perhaps a similar phenomenon of premature predation has occurred with the advent
of the "Defense of Marriage Act', Pub. L. No. 104-99, 110 Stat. 2419, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738
and 1 U.S.C. § 7 CDOMA"). DOMA was passed in fear that state court developments in Hawaii
will result in the recognition of same-sex marriages. The federal legislature took it upon itself
to foreclose the possibility of required interstate recognition of such marriages under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause by asserting that the Clause does not cover same-sex marriage decrees.
Thus, the federal government made a nationwide "pre-emptive strike" against homophiles
working for marriage rights on a state-by-state basis.
I do not want to overstate the tolerance of local communities, particularly as compared with
policy made at the national level. See Equality Foundationof GreaterCincinnati,Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2519, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1044
(1996) (upholding a city charter amendment preventing the city council from providing
"preferential treatment' based on homosexual orientation). Nonetheless, the relevant question
is whether smaller political markets are more likely to be affected by competition and migration
patterns.
26. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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heightened judicial protection of gays. To him, gays are not an
oppressed discrete and insular minority but a cohesive, affluent, and
organized part of the powerful elite. 27 They suffer none of the freerider or resource problems that disempower larger, more diffuse, and
28
more poorly organized minorities.
Putting aside this reductionist understanding of what it means
to be affluent or powerful, the first two propositions outlined above
begin to show why Justice Scalia's economic analysis of interest group
interaction is incomplete. His economic model never takes into account the need for competition among communities, 29 the rights of
people to travel to and form communities, or the unfairness and stifling of democracy that occurs when subgroups are denied the right to
grow independently and gain political strength.
Of course, to all of this Justice Scalia might offer three responses. First, he might insist that there was a fair and typical political fight among interest groups at the statewide level and gays
lost; those in Aspen, Denver, or Boulder certainly can claim no right
to absent themselves from the politics of Colorado, a state they presumably chose to live in. But such a response assumes the answer to
the difficult questions of democracy in Romer v. Evans. Was the fight
on the state level fair, or was it a premature attack on thriving, local
political communities?
Second, Justice Scalia might claim that he is not interested in
the economics of group and community formation and political evolution. This would indeed be an odd response, since it is he who championed the use of interest-group analysis in not only Romer v. Evans,
30
but other areas of law as well.
27. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The "discrete and insular minorites" approach can be traced back to Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. For an early
effort to reconceptualize Carolene Products,see Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products,
98 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 715-716 (1985).
28. See Johnson v. TransportationAgency, Santa ClaraCounty, 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the
Theory of Groups 53-57 (Harvard U., 1971) (discussing superior action effectiveness of smaller
groups).

29. See note 18 and accompanying text.
30. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretationof Statutes: Toward
a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1295, 1304-08 (1990)
(describing public choice theory and interest-group analysis as an informing principle behind

Justice Scalia and other textualists' abhorrence for legislative history as a tool of statutory
interpretation); Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 21-24 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part) (opining that a local provision requiring landlords to reduce rent for
"hardship" tenants is a form of forced private welfare and therefore in violation of the Takings

Clause).
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Third, Justice Scalia might say that municipalities and citizens thereof have no rights separate from and independent of their
rights as citizens of a state. It is this last point that is quite
intriguing, and here that Professor Schacter's quest for a redefinition
of democracy falls short in not including a discussion about which
units of government-and which civic relationships-deserve either
constitutional or political recognition in a democracy. In a series of
cases arising early in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court held
that municipalities and citizens thereof had no constitutional status. 31
States were the only constitutionally relevant unit of local
government. It seems that this claim ought to be open to reexamination by Professor Schacter. Perhaps for her the question is
not worth pursuing, since we have a Supreme Court that has recently
reaffirmed notions of state sovereignty and re-emphasized the special
role that states have in the federal union. 32
Against this background it seems unlikely that the Court
would have much interest in abandoning the states' rights revival and
embracing a conception of federalism that recognizes more local governmental units and the individual as a citizen of a municipality. But
as odd as that interpretation would be in the current constitutional
climate, it can be found and traced back to earlier cases in which the
Court extended the right to vote to municipal elections a3 Moreover, in
this context the Court's recent opinions on racially-drawn voting
districts offer some interesting parallels as well. Justice Kennedy and
31.
See, for example, Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) (stating
that the United States Constitution does not protect municipalities from state control, and that
"[m]unicipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State," subject at all times to the whim
or will of that state). See also City of Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Railway Co.,
196 U.S. 539, 548-50 (1905) (collecting cases establishing that "[tihe city is the creature of the
State" and thus has no constitutional significance as a government body).
32. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995) (holding the
Gun-Free School Zones Act unconstitutional as an impermissible regulation of intra-state
commerce); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the federal
government may not co-opt the machinery of the state government to implement federal
regulations and therefore striking as unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy Act). See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 456-70 (1991)
(holding that the federal government may not infringe on a state's right to prescribe
qualifications for state officials and therefore rejecting an ADEA challenge to state law
prescribing mandatory retirement for state judges). For an extreme version of state sovereignty
see Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1875-914 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
33. See Rome v.United States, 446 U.S. 156, 166 (1980) (applying the Voting Rights Act to
municipalities). For a more general argument that the city has constitutional significance see
Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057 (1980). See also Daniel B.
Rodriguez, Turning Federalism Inside Out. Intrastate Aspects of Interstate Regulatory
Competition, 1996 Yale L. & Pol. Rev./Yale J. Reg. 149, 158 ('The notion that interstate
regulatory competition involves solely the states qua states is naive."); id. at 171-72 (urging
analysis of regulatory arrangements between states and local governments).
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Justice O'Connor seem most troubled by the drawing of district lines
that appear odd or peculiar and do not follow more "naturally occurring" boundaries or living patterns. 34 In their view, compactness, the
cohesiveness of a community, and respect for local governmental units
should determine districting. It may be that their broader acceptance
of the political significance of these local political-geographic
lines-represented in Romer v. Evans by the political actions of towns
like Aspen, Denver, and Boulder-that made Justice O'Connor and
Justice Kennedy willing to set aside the statewide initiative and
restore the governmental actions of these local political communities.
At bottom, therefore, Romer v. Evans is a case about the formation, survival, and recognition of political communities. The reinstatement of the local gay rights ordinances and rejection of the actions of the people of the state of Colorado suggests the need for a
discussion about political participation at various levels of government. It seems appropriate to inquire into these questions-vexing as
they might be-before discussing more general rights of political
participation.
Proposition Three: There may be an even more powerful
relationship between the Court's assertion in Romer v. Evans that the
Colorado initiative was "unprecedentedin our jurisprudence"and the
centralproblem of gay marginalizationand disenfranchisement.
For Professor Schacter the problem of disenfranchisement and
democracy are inextricably related. And she is surely correct in arguing that the disenfranchisement protected against in Romer v. Evans
occurs on many levels. Most clearly, gay participation in the pluralist
arena was affected by Amendment 2. Robbed of the power to enact
protective laws, gays were given little incentive to participate in
ordinary politics. In the private sphere, Amendment 2's repeal of the
antidiscrimination laws left gays vulnerable in the manner
highlighted by Professor Schacter. 35 What Proposition Three suggests
is that the disenfranchisement, vulnerability, and invisibility may go
even deeper than Schacter argues, to the basic level of identity construction. The point is worth pursuing, if for no other reason than

34. See, for example, Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 634-36 (1993) (describing one of the
ultimately unconstitutional districts at hand as a "Rorschach ink blot text," and a "bug
splattered on a windshield").
35. Schacter, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 401-02 (cited in note 5).
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that two people with quite different outlooks-Justice Scalia and
Ronald Dworkin-have raised similar questions about the issue of
disenfranchisement and identity.
Dworkin questions whether Amendment 2 is unique simply
because it places certain legislative or governmental measures beyond
the power of a local government to enact. 36 What Dworkin argues is
that this is the whole point of a Constitution-to take issues out of the
everyday local political process. Justice Scalia makes the point in a
different and more hard-edged way. He suggests that Amendment 2
is really no different from a law providing that only state officials can
offer a city contract to relatives of the city's mayor. 37 The example
and Amendment 2 are identical for Justice Scalia, because they both
take an issue salient to a discrete group of people, place that issue
outside the normal political channels, and demand that the group
achieves its political success through a more onerous process. 38

The majority in Romer v. Evans certainly made no effort to
respond to the question raised by Professor Dworkin and Justice
Scalia. Professor Schacter attempts to do so by emphasizing the
many ways in which Amendment 2 operated to disenfranchise gays in
36. See Ronald Dworkin, Sex, Death, and the Courts,N.Y. Review of Books 44, 48-49 (Aug.
8, 1996). See also Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1634-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing the Eighteenth
Amendment as an example of an enactment that placed an issue-consumption of alcohol-out
of reach of not only local policy and state legislation, but state constitutional amendments and
federal legislation as well).
37. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38. There is an established line of cases holding that state and local officials may not take
certain issues out of the normal political process and impose more demanding requirements on
those seeking to enact laws that address those issues. See Washington v. Seattle School Dist.
No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (striking down as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause a state
statute adopted through initiative that would prohibit local school boards from busing students
to desegregate their schools); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969) (invalidating as
violative of the Equal Protection Clause an amendment to a city charter that would impose a
heightened voting requirement to approve any city housing ordinance that sought to prevent
discrimination). The Court has, however, made clear that this line of cases is limited to racial
issues. See Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. at 484-87. See also Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d
565, 573 n.2 (6th Cir. 1986); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 140-41 (1971) (refusing to extend
Hunter beyond racial discrimination). The Court in Romer chose not to rely on this line of cases,
probably because Amendment 2 lacked the racial subject matter that would trigger stricter
scrutiny. The Court's rationale in Romer, based on rational basis scrutiny, made it clear that
there was no interest in reviewing laws based on sexual orientation under a strict scrutiny
standard. Romer, however, appears to be another case in which the Court has applied a
heightened rational basis test without so characterizing its approach. See City of Cleburne,
Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Although the Coures doctrinal
analysis in Romer may be characterized as a basic failure in the Court's handicraft, some have
found the incompleteness both substantively and strategically inventive. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 53-71 (1996); Toni M. Massaro, Gay
Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 45, 86-87 (1996) (arguing that the Court's "analytically
imperfect" analysis allowed it to meet its goals of"overturn[ing] an especially egregious abuse of
the political process, while creating no extension of equal protection rights").
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public and private life. But Professor Schacter's response could be
even more powerful if it claimed that the most basic individual freedom to recognize and develop a personal identity must include an
element of social and political activity. Going back to Justice Scalia's
example, would a person denied a right to a municipal contract claim
that such a law impedes the ability to develop an individual identity
or a full sense of self'?39 Except perhaps in the most corrupt of local
patronage systems such a claim would be hard to maintain. Yet in
the context of Romer v. Evans the issue is far more complex. The very
scope and harshness of Amendment 2 may well impede the right to
develop a personal identity and sense of self. Political participation-group formation, lobbying on key issues, and political identity-may be conceived of as a central part of the important process of
how an individual establishes and defines a gay identity. 40

In the

private sphere that Professor Schacter discusses, the forced invisibility that may result from Amendment 2 is likely to stifle the same kind
of development of self. Thus, Amendment 2 tells a group that an
important part of identity formation is either futile or faces high
barriers to success. Gays are not only limited in their political and
social activities, but are also told that they may not participate in the
41
most basic human experience-the development of a self-identity.
39. Justice Scalia's point could be made more powerfully. For example, if a state constitution was amended by initiative to bar the death penalty or create a right to choose an abortion, would such a political result unconstitutionally disenfranchise those groups that had
previously lobbied for the opposite result? The answer to even these examples no doubt lies in

the differences in obstacles to identity formation these laws may pose as contrasted to the law in
Romer.
40. Professor Cheshire Calhoun argues that being "gay" is defined as being a breaker of
heterosexual laws. Cheshire Calhoun, Denaturalizing and Desexualizing Lesbian and Gay
Identity, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1859, 1860, 1868-70 (1993). A logical extension of Professor Calhoun's
definition places political lobbying for the repeal of sexual conduct laws and antidiscrimination
regulations at the center of gay identity. See also Cox and Gallois, Gay and Lesbian Identity
Development, 30(4) J. Homosexuality at 20-22 (cited in note 16) (describing political action as an
identity enhancement strategy).
41. At a more fundamental level, Amendment 2 may have threatened not only gay
identity but gay existence. In the state court and at oral argument before the Supreme Court
there was discussion whether Amendment 2 would prohibit law enforcement officers and other
government officials from protecting gays from physical assault. The Court's majority opinion
alludes to the issue but never develops the point. See Roiner, 116 S.Ct. at 1624-27. See also id.
at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disrespecting the "parade of horribles" including lack of
protection from assault that was raised at oral argument). The potential sweep of Amendment
2 thus raised a host of problems, and interesting questions about the obligation of the
government to protect citizens from assault. In other cases the Court has been reluctant to
include such a freedom within the concept of due process. See, for example, Deshaney v.
Winnebago County, Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 194-203 (1989). Such an outcome in
Romer would indeed have been puzzling. The Court in other contexts has been eager to use the
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Such a hypothesis is indeed speculative, and requires a much better
understanding of the relationship between sexuality, identity, and
political and social activity. Yet it may be a study worth undertaking,
for if the concept of identity is so bound up with political
participation, the disenfranchisement identified by Professor Schacter
is particularly devastating. So understood, the questions raised by
Professor Dworkin and Justice Scalia are answered, and there is even
more force to the majority's description that Amendment 2 is
"unprecedented in our jurisprudence."

common law to define the liberties of individuals. See Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 876-902
(1987). Yet at the common law the freedom to be free of assault and battery was well
established.

